Anticipated verbal feedback induces altruistic behavior by Ellingsen, Tore & Johannesson, Magnus





Department of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics, Box 6501, SE-113 83 
Stockholm, Sweden; e-mail: tore.ellingsen@hhs.se
 
Magnus Johannesson  
Department of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics, Box 6501, SE-113 83 











A distinctive feature of humans compared to other species is the high rate of cooperation with 
non-kin. One explanation is that humans are motivated by concerns for social esteem. In this 
paper we experimentally investigate the impact of anticipated verbal feedback on altruistic 
behavior. We study pairwise interactions in which one subject, the “divider”, decides how to 
split a sum of money between herself and a recipient. Thereafter, the recipient can send an 
unrestricted anonymous message to the divider. The subjects’ relationship is anonymous and 
one-shot to rule out any reputation effects. Compared to a control treatment without feedback 
messages, donations increase substantially when recipients can communicate. With verbal 
feedback, the fraction of zero donations decreases from about 40% to about 20%, and there is 
a corresponding increase in the fraction of equal splits from about 30% to about 50%. 
Recipients who receive no money almost always express disapproval of the divider, 
sometimes strongly and in foul language. Following an equal split, almost all recipients praise 
the divider. The results suggest that anticipated verbal rewards and punishments play a role in 
promoting altruistic behavior among humans. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Human altruism is considered an evolutionary puzzle (Nowak 2006).1 While repeated 
interaction and reputation formation can explain altruistic behavior in small closely-knit 
groups, altruism is often considerable among strangers who interact only once. Here, we 
investigate the hypothesis that altruism is caused by feelings of shame and pride and that these 
feelings are accentuated by others’ verbal evaluation.  
Our evidence comes from a dictator game experiment with recipient feedback. We find 
that the opportunity for verbal feedback substantially increases donations compared to a 
control treatment without any feedback.   
In a typical dictator game, one person (the divider) is in charge of dividing a resource 
between herself and another person (the recipient). Usually, the resource is an amount of 
money, and the divider is free to choose any division. While nothing prevents the divider from 
taking all the money, a substantial fraction of the dictators leaves some money to the 
recipient. In laboratory experiments in Western cultures, the equal split is the second most 
common allocation, with the average donation typically falling in the interval 10-30% 
(Camerer, 2003). Henrich et al. (2004) report similar results from subject pools that are 
isolated from Western culture.  
There are several reasons for thinking that generosity in dictator games is driven by a 
desire for social esteem. When the divider’s choice is observable to the experimenter 
(Hoffman et al., 1994) and to the recipient (Dana et al., 2006; Andreoni and Bernheim, 2006), 
the division becomes more generous. Even pictures of eyes, subtly triggering a sense of being 
watched, has a significant positive impact on generosity in both laboratory experiments 
(Haley and Fessler, 2005) and field settings (Bateson, Nettle, and Roberts, 2006). This 
                                                 
1 Selfless or altruistic behavior is here defined as refraining from gaining personal advantage at another’s 
expense. Cooperation results when several people engage in altruistic behavior.    3
evidence is congruent with the long-standing view that prosocial behavior is fuelled by the 
desire to feel (justified) pride and to avoid feeling shame,2 and more generally with the desire 
to signal favorable characteristics.3 Importantly, these are not loose associations. Andreoni 
and Bernheim (2006) formally demonstrate that a signaling model predicts the observed 
spikes in dictator game data.  
We hypothesize that feelings of shame and pride are accentuated by emotional 
communication. Knowing that someone is angry does not arouse the same level of shame as 
facing the angry person. Likewise, feelings of justified pride are accentuated by laudatory 
speeches, even if the speeches contain no new information. If so, altruistic behavior ought to 
increase when recipients can provide verbal feedback. The recipient’s approval is a symbolic 
reward; the recipient’s disapproval is a symbolic punishment. Consistent with our hypothesis, 
work in social psychology indicates that feedback in the form of praise raises the level of 
pride and satisfaction in performing a task (Webster et al. 2003; Gaines et al. 2005).  
Although the applied psychology literature has found significant effects of symbolic 
rewards in the workplace and in schools (Henderlong and Lepper 2002; Stajkovic and 
Luthans 2003), such studies suffer from the problem that symbolic rewards may be correlated 
with subsequent material rewards. A similar objection may be directed at the few 
experimental studies that consider symbolic punishment in repeated public goods games 
(Gächter and Fehr, 1999; Masclet et al., 2003; Noussair and Tucker, 2005). While behavior 
does tend to become more prosocial when communication is possible, it is difficult to know 
whether behavior changes in order to reduce the suffering generated directly by the verbal 
                                                 
2 See, for example, Smith (1790), Cooley (1922), and Scheff (1988). Fessler (2004) argues that pride and shame 
are human universals and provides an evolutionary theory of these emotions.  
 
3 For a recent survey of signaling theories of altruistic behavior, see Bliege Bird and Smith (2005).   4
sanction or to mitigate the effect that verbal messages have on future material payoffs.4 
Together with Xiao and Houser (2007) (to be discussed below) ours is the first study to isolate 
the impact of anticipated feedback on altruistic behavior.5
 
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PROCEDURES 
 
We conduct a one-shot anonymous dictator game experiment with and without ex post 
recipient communication in the form of an unrestricted written message. The dictator game is 
chosen over the more popular ultimatum game in order to avoid confounding altruism with 
risk aversion or false beliefs. Moreover, we want to study the generosity of the divider rather 
than the recipient’s willingness to engage in costly punishment. According to Koenigs et al. 
(2007), charity and punishment engage different parts of the brain. We choose written 
messages over other forms of communication both for simplicity and in order to maintain 
anonymity. Hatfield et al. (1995) show that many people experience strong emotional 
reactions to written scripts.  
In both our treatments, one subject (the divider) decides how to allocate SEK 120 
between herself and another subject in another room (the recipient) (SEK=Swedish Kronor; 
$1≈ SEK 7.5 at the time of the experiment). In the feedback treatment, the recipient has the 
opportunity to send a message after learning the divider’s allocation; in the control treatment, 
the recipient has no communication option. 
                                                 
4 Relatedly, the fact that people are generally more cooperative when they are allowed to interact face to face or 
merely to see their opponents, as documented by Ostrom and Walker (1997) and Bohnet and Frey (1999) 
respectively, could in principle be due either to increased empathy or to reputational effects. 
5 The same authors, Xiao and Houser (2005), study how the possibility of feedback messages affects recipients 
in ultimatum games. They find that ex post verbal feedback among recipients decreased their likelihood of 
rejecting an unfair offer, suggesting that expression of disapproval is a substitute for monetary punishment. 
   5
The subjects were recently enrolled undergraduate business and economics students at 
the Stockholm School of Economics. The experiment was conducted in early September 
2006. Subjects were randomly allocated between the two treatments and we carried out five 
sessions (three with the feedback treatment and two with the control treatment). A total of 276 
subjects participated in the experiment yielding 134 pairs of observations (85 in the feedback 
group and 53 in the control group). Subjects in a pair were anonymous with respect to each 
other, and the decision of a specific subject could not be observed by other subjects or the 
experimenters. The two treatments are further described below (the complete instructions are 
available in Appendix 2).  
  In the feedback group, subjects are recruited to two separate rooms called room A and 
room B. Dividers are in room A and recipients are in room B. The subjects are welcomed and 
told not to talk to each other. Subjects in both rooms receive numbered instruction sheets. 
Subjects in room A also receive an envelope marked with the same number that contains six 
SEK 20 bills. The subjects read the instructions, and thereafter they are allowed to ask 
questions individually and privately (after first raising their hands).    
The experimenter in room A calls one person at a time and the subject takes her 
envelope and goes behind a screen. In private behind the screen, the subject decides how 
many SEK 20 bills to leave in the envelope and how many to keep for her own use. The 
subject then seals the envelope and drops it in a box marked “Mail”. The subject thereafter 
returns to their seat. When all subjects in room A have made their decisions, the experimenter 
gives the box marked ”Mail” to an assistant that is waiting outside of room A. The assistant 
takes the box with the envelopes to room B and distributes the envelopes to the respective 
recipients. Each recipient opens the envelope and pockets any money in the envelope. The 
recipients then writes down the amount in the envelope on a form marked “Result/Message”. 
The recipients are told that they have the opportunity to write a message on the form and to   6
thereafter put the form in the numbered envelope. The assistant then collects the envelopes 
and gives them to the experimenter in room A (the assistant thereafter leaves the room). The 
experimenter then distributes the envelopes to the dictators in room A. The dividers are told to 
open the envelope and read the message and thereafter to fold the “Result/Message” form, 
without putting it back into the envelope. The experimenter then passes around the box 
marked “Mail” and the dividers are told to put the folded forms into the box (the forms now 
lack any identification numbers and a specific form/decision cannot therefore be linked with 
any specific divider in room A). The experiment is then over.        
In the control group, the experiment proceeds in exactly the same way until the 
recipients have written down the result on the results form. The recipients are told to fold the 
form after they have written down the amount in the envelope, and the assistant then passes 





Figure 1 shows the distribution of donations in the two treatments. On average, subjects 
in the control group donated 24.84% of the endowment to the recipients. In the feedback 
group the average donation was 34.12% of the endowment, an increase of almost 40%. The 
difference between the groups is statistically significant at the 5% level (p=0.023 according to 
a non parametric Mann-Whitney test; two-sided p-value).6 The fraction of subjects who 
donate zero decreases substantially with feedback, from 42% to 21%. With feedback there is 
                                                 
6 The significance level is very similar if a t-test is used instead (p=0.036) or if a bootstrap test is used 
(p=0.020). The significance level for the bootstrap test was based on 5,099 bootstrap replications; see Ellingsen 
and Johannesson (2004) for a further discussion of this test.    7
also a sizeable increase in the fraction of subjects that divide the endowment equally between 
the subjects. This fraction increases from 30% to 48%.  
  The messages themselves also provide interesting information. A complete translation 
of all messages is provided in Appendix 1. For ease of characterization, we furthermore 
classify the messages according to whether they express disapproval, approval, or a neutral 
evaluation of the divider. All 18 recipients that received no money sent messages to the 
dividers, and 17 of them expressed disapproval. Many of these messages communicated 
strongly negative views, frequently in foul language. Of the 41 recipients that received half 
the endowment, 38 sent a message to the divider. All of these messages except one praised the 
divider. For the recipients that received amounts of 20% or 40%, reactions were more mixed 
with about the same fractions of approval, disapproval, and neutral messages. 
  Generally, the message content is consistent with a desire to amplify the divider’s 
feelings of shame and pride. An alternative explanation is that the receiver uses emotional 
contagion (Hatfield, Cacioppo, and Rapson, 1993) as a reward mechanism. While some of the 
positive messages may possibly be understood as an attempt to let the divider share the 
responder’s feeling of happiness, the negative messages are predominantly angry. (Only two 
of them try to make the divider see the situation from their point of view.) It appears unlikely 
that the purpose of these messages is to induce anger in the divider. Instead, they are designed 
to elicit the unpleasant sensation of shame.  
      
DISCUSSION 
 
In conclusion, our study demonstrates that anticipated verbal feedback in the form of 
anonymous written messages induces a substantial increase in altruistic behavior towards 
otherwise defenseless opponents. Since an anonymous written message is a mild form of   8
feedback compared to naturally occurring personal communication, the identified effect is 
likely to underestimate the behavioral impact of anticipated emotional feedback in more 
realistic settings. 
Comparing the donation level in our feedback condition with ultimatum game proposals 
reported by Ellingsen and Johannesson (2005) for an almost identical subject pool, we find 
that they are both about 35%. With the caveat that the comparison is not based on strict 
randomization, and that it neglects differential framing effects, the impact on divider behavior 
of anticipated verbal feedback is thus of similar average size as the effect of the recipient’s 
punishment power in ultimatum games. Moreover, since material sanctions are themselves 
expressive of anger, it seems likely that some of the disciplining effect of rejections in the 
ultimatum game is due to the divider’s desire to avoid the feeling of shame rather than just the 
anticipated material loss.  
Independently of us, Xiao and Houser (2007) have conducted a similar study. Like us, 
they study a dictator game in which the recipient could send an anonymous message to the 
divider after the allocation decision. However, there are several design differences. Notably, 
Xiao and Houser restrict the set of offers to seven discrete levels, ruling out the possibility 
that the divider takes more than 90% of the available amount. Broadly, the findings coincide, 
but our effects are larger in magnitude and statistical significance, and our increase in equal 
splits is not matched by their data. There are several possible explanations for these 
differences. Xiao and Houser’s offer restriction and the fact that they ask their subjects not to 
use foul or threatening language imply that verbal feedback is milder, and the fact that they do 
not insist that subjects read the messages means that the subjects can protect themselves from 
strongly negative feedback. The differences in findings between the experiments are thus well 
in line with our hypothesis.   9
Our findings suggest that people feel shame and pride when considering others’ opinion 
of them, and that they are only partially successful in managing these feelings. Others can 
magnify the feelings through emotional verbal feedback. Pride and shame in turn promote 
altruistic behavior.  
Reputational theories of one-shot cooperation are sometimes attacked on the grounds 
that the experimental subjects understand that interaction is anonymous and therefore cannot 
care about their reputation. That criticism is based on the mistaken assumption that cognition 
completely trumps feelings. As Hagen and Hammerstein (2006, p343) memorably notes: 
“Young men certainly know that there is no chance they will encounter the attractive woman 
appearing in the Playboy centerfold, and they would truthfully and accurately affirm that they 
knew that the centerfold was just a picture in a magazine that they could not interact with, yet 
they might still become aroused by the photograph.”  
Our view that people are aware of their propensity to feel shame and pride, and are 
unable to fully control these feelings, have additional testable implications. For example, if 
dictator game dividers are given freedom to choose whether to read the feedback messages, 
generous dividers ought to be more prone to read. Likewise, the theory explains why people 
prefer not to obtain information about whether a self-interested action will cause harm to 
others, as documented by Dana, Weber, and Kuang (2006). Finally, the reputational theory 
has the potential to explain field evidence on cooperation in common pools. According to 
Ostrom (1990), such cooperation tends to be sustained primarily through the use of small 
symbolic fines. 
The reputational theory of altruism does not logically preclude other theories, such as 
strong reciprocity (Gintis, 2000; Fehr, Fischbacher, and Gächter, 2002) and empathy (Batson 
et al. 1988; Batson and Shaw 1991; Singer et al. 2004; Fehr and Singer 2005). It seems that 
some people behave altruistically when all reputational cues are absent (Johannesson and   10
Persson, 2000). Quite possibly, altruism is caused by several proximate mechanisms, just as 
the evolution of these proximate mechanisms may have been caused by several ultimate 
mechanisms (Nowak, 2006).   11
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APPENDIX 1: MESSAGES IN THE STUDY (The original messages were in Swedish. 




Message Evaluation  of 
the divider in 
the message 
0  So you choose to take all the money yourself, you greedy 
bastard. I was just wondering if there was anyone who 
would do that and the answer apparently is yes, apparently 
people like you exist! Have a nice evening! 
Disapproval 
0  Thanks you greedy bastard. You will like it as investment 
banker! I hope you will buy something nice 
Disapproval 
0  Do you scream when you shit?  Disapproval 
0  Shouldn’t you at least be a bit loyal, I would at least have 
left something! 
Disapproval 
0  You are very selfish, greedy and stupid!!!!!! I would really 
need some money! 
Disapproval 
0 Greedy  bastard  Disapproval 
0  Honestly! You must really be in deep shit if you think you 
are worth the entire amount! A hot tip is to carry out a 
household budget, income, expenses, use a cash-book and 
do some planning and it will not be a problem to live on 
CSN* in the future!  
Disapproval 
0  THANKS! Couldn’t you have shared?  You would still have 
gotten 60 kronor without doing anything to deserve them.   
Disapproval 
0 Cheapskate!  Disapproval 
0  You were a greedy bastard!  Disapproval 
0  You greedy bastard! No but it’s right, feel no pressure most 
people would probably have done the same thing. But 
come-on you could at least have put in 20!!! I hope you will 
enjoy your undeserved money!! You’re lucky it’s 
anonymous.  
Disapproval 
0  Not even 20! To be sure rational. Buy me lunch instead? 
21042!!!  
Disapproval 
0  I will come looking for you silly idiot!  Disapproval 
0  A pity that I know who you are!!!  Disapproval 
0  Haha! I would have done the same thing! We students at 
Stockholm School of Economics are probably rather similar. 
A greedy bunch. 
Neutral 
0  Thank you very much you greedy bastard  Disapproval 
0  You greedy bastard!  Disapproval 
0 Clown  Disapproval 
20  OK, so this is fair according to you?? Imagine the reverse, 
that you will receive 20 out of the possible 120 kronor… 
Disapproval 
20  Hi! Thank you for giving me some money, as I know that I 
have difficulties myself to say no to extra money. However, 
it would have been more fair if you had split them 50:50. 
Approval 
20  Thank you for the sympathy-twenty! I would have preferred 
more, but what the hell, I’m not bitter. (I would have done 
Neutral   18
the same thing myself). I’m furthermore more bitter that I 
didn’t get any lunch today, so I would have preferred to be 
in room A. I hope you will buy some good beers for the 
money… I think I will do that anyway 
20  I would probably have done the same if I got the chance. 
But you could have been a bit more generous… Like 40.. 
Neutral 
20  NO MESSAGE    
20  Thanks for the money! You made a generous choice by 
giving me twenty. Personally I would probably have 
pocketed the entire amount. I am going for some after-work 
beer after this together with some friends. You can afford 
that now. Tempted? Have a good day./nr. 8  
 
Approval 
20  Okay you fagot, 20 symbolic… Your karma would have 
become much stronger if you had kept 60, but I’m not 
totally dissatisfied. Some time ago I could have bought a 
small packet of cigarettes for the money, but now when they 
only sell 20-packs I have to pay 20 myself. But there is no 
trouble with that as I’m heavily spoiled and I can always get 
money from mum and dad instead. Dear allowance holder, 
enjoy the hundred! Find me please, so that we can go on a 
date and if I’m lucky I will marry rich!  
Disapproval 
20  You greedy bastard. Normally you give at least 1/3. You 
have to be a boy! The person to the right of you (nr 26) will 
get a long and happy life. 
Disapproval 
20  Hi! I don’t know if you 1. exists 2. has received the same 
information as me 3. will receive this message. If you want 
to know who the other person is and so on my name is 
Pierre Jarmieus (seminar group 7, freshmen group 15). (the 
union web…mail) Thanks for the bill 
Neutral 
20  Oh, oh! I was prepared for nothing, magnanimous, a golden 
star. Hm, the girl two persons away received 60. Difficult 
trade-off if her counterpart is foolhardy or very 
goodhearted… 
Approval 
20 Generous  boy/girl….  Disapproval 
40  Not even 50-50? You disloyal devil! Ha ha. Keep the 
change you filthy animal. Have fun with the extra 20 
kronor. 
Disapproval 
40  I don’t want to be greedy, but WHY do you deserve twice as 
much as me for this time? 
Disapproval 
40  40 kronor was more than I expected, so thanks.  Approval 
40  Are you still living at home? Thanks anyway  Neutral 
40  I would have kept everything  Neutral 
40  THANKS! You owe me 20 kronor  Neutral 
40  Thanks for the money  Approval 
40  Thanks! I thought I would get an empty envelope. However, 
totally even would have been more fair or what do you 
think. What would you have thought if you had been in 
room B. I would have done that in any case (believe it or 
not) 
Approval   19
40  You did exactly what I would have done. Weird experiment 
by the way 
Approval 
40  Why didn’t you take all the money?  Neutral 
40  You probably needed it more than me.  Neutral 
40  So, you think you are worth twice as much as me?!  Disapproval 
60  Thanks! I would have done the same thing.  Approval 
60  Thanks - you are a wonderfully fair person!  Approval 
60 Thanks!  Approval 
60  Thank you for your humanity  Approval 
60  Thanks! That was fraternally…  Approval 
60 Thanks,  super!  Approval 
60  That was fair 50/50. I hope your money will be useful! 
Thanks!  
Approval 
60  Thank you so much! I would have understood if you had 
taken all the money yourself, as it was your money for a 
while. But as it was such easy money you probably thought 
that you could as well be fair and split it, eventhough I will 
never find out who you are…. So THANKS! 
Approval 
60  Just to be grateful and receive! With the help of your 
generosity and your big heart I can tonight break the black-
pudding curse. No more pea soup! You have a standing 
invitation to dinner at my place. The door is always open. 
With love!/XXX  
Approval 
60 NO  MESSAGE   
60  I would have done the same if I was in that situation. The 
task was actually more exciting for you as you were the one 
making the choice. Exciting to be held accountable for 
yourself./… 
Approval 
60  Super, thanks! (mucho fair)  Approval 
60  Thank you so much, that was generous! I would have taken 
all the money myself! 
Approval 
60  Thanks! I was considering what I would have done, and 
decided that I probably would have taken 100 kronor! The 
reason was that that was how much I thought I would get. 
But the “next” time I will probably think differently 
Approval 
60 NO  MESSAGE   
60  Thank you so much. To be honest I don’t know if I would 
have done the same knowing that it is anonymous. But I’m 
grateful towards your benevolence. 
Approval 
60  Thanks, thanks. A diplomatic decision. Vi split the money 
equally. I wonder if this is the average for all students at the 
Stockholm School of Economics… 
Approval 
60   Thanks! That was just and fair. I would probably have taken 
all myself, but I appreciate it! 
Approval 
60  THANKS! I would never have done that myself (why give 
money to someone that you cannot get credit for?) but 
magnanimous and generous of you! Live well! 
Approval 
60  You did the right thing! To be honest this was more than I 
had expected from a student from Stockholm School of 
Approval   20
Economics. I hope that you will continue life with the same 
outlook.   
60  Dear student friend? Instead of a “damned cheapskate” I can 
with joy see that there in spite of all exist solidarity and 
fairness in the world! It feels liberating! Haha, thanks for the 
generosity! Chill 
Approval 
60  I would have done the same thing. Thanks. (On another 
matter there lives a purple giraffe below a rock on my 
cloud!) 
Approval 
60  Thanks! That was a fair decision.  Approval 
60  Thanks for the generosity!  Approval 
60  Dear A. I cordially thank you for this gift. In your position I 
would probably have taken most of the money myself, but 
to show that I’m not a total egoist I would probably have 
left one 20 kronor bill. So I’m lucky that I wasn’t you. Good 
luck with your studies. Personally I think it’s a little bit too 
much right now. I don’t know if you feel the same way, but 
if you do remember Churchill: “The ability of success is to 
go from failure to failure without loss of enthusiasm.”  
Approval 
60  There is hope for a better world!  Approval 
60  Hallo! When I discovered what it was about I was a bit 
disappointed as we had to go from A to B. But it was a good 
outcome. What is going on otherwise? Maybe there will be 
steak tonight, who knows… Here is a rabbit by the way: 
(DRAWING OF RABBIT NOT INCLUDED HERE)  
Approval 
60 NO  MESSAGE   
60  Thank you very much! It was fair and morally right. Good!  Approval 
60  Hallo!!? You were a generous devil. I would have pocketed 
everything myself. But thank you so much! You will surely 
go to heaven 
Approval 
60 Nicely  acted!  Approval 
60  Fair! I would have done the same!  Approval 
60  I would have done the same thing. Super!  Approval 
60  I thank you I thank you. Well done, know my lunch is paid 
for 
Approval 
60 Thanks!  Approval 
60  Thank you very much for the money! It was cute of you to 
split it equally between us! I would absolutely have done the 
same thing! Have a wonderful afternoon/evening. 
Approval 
60  Thank you very much! It made me really happy. I would 
probably only have left 20…Now there will be a few coffee 
latte! 
Approval 
60  Thank you very much! It feels like a fair and wise decision 
given the conditions. 
Approval 
60  So, here we share equally and fraternally in a true socialist 
spirit… I don’t know which incentives you had in your 
situation, but I know that I would have done differently.. 
Disapproval 
60   Thanks! Really! I was really surprised. You didn’t gain 
from this, but it honours you. 
Approval   21
60  Thanks! Unfortunately I must confess that you wouldn’t 
have received a krona from me. But if it’s ever revealed 
who you are, I will buy you a beer. 
Approval 
80 Big  thanks!  GIRL?  Approval 
120  Thanks, thanks. If you want to split 50/50 I will be outside 
the main entrance for a while after the experiment! 
 
120 Thanks!  Approval 
* CSN is the national authority that handles the Swedish financial aid for students; i.e. loans 
and grants for students.   22
APPENDIX 2: EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS  
 
The original instructions were in Swedish. This appendix reprints a translation of the 
instructions.  
 
INSTRUCTIONS (feedback group)  
 
Thank you for participating in this experiment. In the experiment each of you will be paired 
with another person in another room. You will not be told who this other person is, neither 
during nor after the experiment. There is an equal number of persons in each room (A and B). 
This is room A (B). Every person in room A and Room B has received these instructions and 
a number that depicts which pair he/she belongs to. In the experiment every person in room A 
will decide how to divide SEK 120 between him/herself and the person in room B with whom 
he/she has been paired.  
 
The experiment runs as follows. Every person in room A has received an envelope marked 
with the number of the person. All the envelopes contain six SEK 20 bills.  
 
The experimenter asks one person at a time in room A to come forward and the person takes 
the envelope and goes behind the screen in room A. The envelope is then opened behind the 
screen where no one else can see what happens.    
 
Behind the screen every person in room A has to decide how many bills, if any, to leave in the 
envelope. The person then pockets the remaining bills. No one else, including those 
conducting the experiment, will know what decision a particular person makes. 
 
When the person behind the screen has made his/her decision he/she seals the envelope and 
puts it in the box marked “Mail” and returns to their seat.   
 
When all envelopes have been handed in, the experimenter gives the envelopes to an assistant 
that is waiting outside of room A. The assistant takes the envelopes to room B and hands out 
each envelope to the counterpart in room B. Every person in room B opens the envelope and 
pockets the money in the envelope. The person also writes down how much money they 
received on the form marked “Results/Message”, which has been given to every person in 
room B.   
 
Thereafter each person in room B has the opportunity to write a message to the person in 
room A on the form marked ”Results/Message”. The person in room B then puts the form 
marked “Results/Message” in the envelope and the assistant collects the envelopes. The 
persons in room B can then leave the room.   
 
The assistant brings the envelopes to room A and gives them to the experimenter; the assistant 
then leaves the room. The experimenter hands out each envelope to the respective person in 
room A. The person in room A takes out the form marked “Results/Message” and reads 
through the message and then folds the form. The experimenter then passes round the box 
marked ”Mail” and every person in room A puts the form marked ”Results/Message” in the 
box (note that as these forms are not market with the number of the pair, the results cannot be 
linked to the number of a specific person). The experiment is then over and the persons in 
room A can leave the room.      23
INSTRUCTIONS (control group)  
 
Thank you for participating in this experiment. In the experiment each of you will be paired 
with another person in another room. You will not be told who this other person is, neither 
during nor after the experiment. There is an equal number of persons in each room (A and B). 
This is room A (B). Every person in room A and Room B has received these instructions and 
a number that depicts which pair he/she belongs to. In the experiment every person in room A 
will decide how to divide SEK 120 between him/herself and the person in room B with whom 
he/she has been paired.  
 
The experiment runs as follows. Every person in room A has received an envelope marked 
with the number of the person. All the envelopes contain six SEK 20 bills.  
 
The experimenter asks one person at a time in room A to come forward and the person takes 
the envelope and goes behind the screen in room A. The envelope is then opened behind the 
screen where no one else can see what happens.    
 
Behind the screen every person in room A has to decide how many bills, if any, to leave in the 
envelope. The person then pockets the remaining bills. No one else, including those 
conducting the experiment, will know what decision a particular person makes. 
 
When the person behind the screen has made his/her decision he/she seals the envelope and 
puts it in the box marked “Mail”. The person can then leave the room. 
 
When all envelopes have been handed in, the experimenter gives the envelopes to an assistant 
that is waiting outside of room A. The assistant takes the envelopes to room B and hands out 
each envelope to the counterpart in room B. Every person in room B opens the envelope and 
pockets the money in the envelope. The person also writes down how much money they 
received on the form marked “Results”, which has been given to every person in room B, and 
then folds this form.   
 
The assistant then passes round the box marked ”Mail” and every person in room B puts the 
form marked ”Results” in the box (note that as these forms are not market with the number of 
the pair, the results cannot be linked to the number of a specific person). The experiment is 
then over and the persons in room B can leave the room.    




Table 1. Experimental results. 
  Experimental Treatment  p-value of difference (two-
sided) 




bootstrap t-test  Mann-
Whitney 
SEK 0  18 (21.18)  22 (41.51)   
SEK 20  11 (12.94)  8 (15.09)   
SEK 40  12 (14.12)  4 (7.55)   
SEK 60  41 (48.24)  16 (30.19)   
SEK 80  1 (1.18)  1 (1.89)   
SEK 100  0 (0.00)  1 (1.89)   
Amount donated 
SEK 120  2 (2.35)  1 (1.89)   
Number of observations 
 
85 53  




0.020 0.036  0.023 










































Figure 1. The distribution of donations in the experiment. 
 
 
 
 
  
 